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The awareness–motivation–capability (AMC) framework instructs firms to be aware of
rivals, yet it offers limited guidance on how to profile those who are not yet rivals but stand
to become so. Because rivals are embedded in dyads, triads, tetrads, etc., a multilevel view
can unearth awareness cues that specify a hostility profile and make the awareness
construct prescient. Studying thousands of competitive encounters over 10 years, we show
that, at the firm and dyad levels, diversification and asymmetric pressure (differential
exposure to competitive pressure) are reliable cues predicting competitive encounters. At
the network level, convergence drives triadic encounters (competitionwith a rival’s rival),
and the degree of separation among indirect competitors defines the outer bounds of the
hostility profile. Specifically, direct rivals and second- and third-degree indirect com-
petitors merit awareness—more distal players do not. Together, the awareness cues and
hostility profile delineate the conceptual bound within which awareness is prescient and
beyond which it is misplaced. Challenging several assumptions, our study shows that an
arena view assists in predicting cross-industry competition; applying firm, dyad, and
network levels of analysis is advisable to better foresee competition; and indirect com-
petitors are “profilable,” allowing us to “see” rivals even before they strike.
Competitivedynamics (CD) researchexplainswhen,
where, why, how, and under what conditions firms
compete. It is therefore a body of literature that mea-
sures, describes, and predicts interfirm competitive
engagements. To better understand and foresee com-
petitive encounters, the domain has long been com-
plemented by the awareness–motivation–capability
(AMC) framework, which explains that competition
ensueswhenfirmsareawareofa threatoropportunity
and possess both motivation and capability to attack
rivals or defend themselves (Chen, 1996; Chen &
Miller, 2012; Smith, Ferrier, & Ndofor, 2001; Yu &
Cannella, 2007). Focusing on the awareness construct
(the first in the AMC framework), it is clear that
scholars and firms are acutely aware of direct rivals
(Chen & Miller, 2012), but they are often ill-informed
about spotting, appraising, and prioritizing indirect
competitors—those who are not yet rivals today but
could become so in the future.1 Given that rivals are
embedded in dyads, triads, tetrads, and so on, we
edify the AMC framework by developing a hostility
profile—an industry-agnostic competitor identifi-
cation prism based on four interdependent aware-
ness cues at the firm, dyad, and network levels. This
profile makes the awareness construct better cali-
brated andmoreprescient to spot indirect competitors.
Using 10 years of data (2007–2016) from 15,824,
693 dyad-year observations on 142,446 competitive
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encounters among firms in the customer experience
management (CEM) arena, our study makes several
contributions to the Special Research Forum (SRF)
“New Ways of Seeing”; two contributions in partic-
ular deserve elaboration, so we describe these chro-
nologically to align with the structure of the paper.
First, currently, the AMC framework assists CD re-
search by profiling rivals based on their industry
membership, and, because firms are often more
connected to each other within than across indus-
tries (Chen, 1996), this approach has served the field
well. Reality, however, shows that competitors cross
industry precincts (McGrath, 2013), which is one
reasonwhy an industry-based awareness construct is
not as predictive as it could be. For example, a cen-
tury ago, railroad barons focused their awareness on
direct rivals—other railway firms—and were blind-
sided by indirect competitors, namely automakers
(Desarbo, Grewal, & Wind, 2006; Levitt, 1960). More
recently, the rivalry among Nanogen, Motorola, Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology, and Genometrix (a
biotech startup,multinational telecom,university, and
manufacturer, respectively) illustrates that to be pre-
scient, competitor identification modalities should (i)
use industry-independent awareness cues, and (ii)
recognize that competition is often multisided. By
taking an arena view, framing competition as re-
lational, and triangulating awareness in terms of an-
teceding cues, we afford scholars a new way of
sighting indirect competitors before they become di-
rect rivals.
Second, firms face some direct rivals and a much
greater number of indirect competitors. While firms
are aware of their direct rivals, discerning the bona
fide high-risk from no-risk indirect competitors is a
daunting task, with which the AMC framework cur-
rentlyoffers limitedhelp.Certainly,not every indirect
competitorwill become a direct rival, andmonitoring
or evenaffording attention to every firm is impractical
(March & Simon, 1958; Ocasio, 1997). Therefore,
there is a clear need to profile indirect competitors
and bound the awareness construct by demarcating
its outer reach (Bansal, Kim,&Wood, 2018).We show
that when the cues are applied together, the hostility
profile guides firms to extend their awareness up to
and including—but not beyond—the rivals of their
rivals’ rivals (third-degree indirect competitors). In
fact, a key contribution of the hostility profile is to
define the conditions under which indirect competi-
tors can becomedirect rivals, and beyondwhich such
threat becomes insignificant.
To recap, past research has used awareness pri-
marily to study known, direct rivals in a single
industry, and rarely to preemptively spot indirect or
cross-industry competitors before hostility ensues.
Using four triangulating awareness cues, we develop
a prescient hostility profile that assists in detecting
which indirect competitors stand to become direct
rivals. By making the awareness construct pre-
dictive, we show that an arena view is highly prog-
nostic of cross-industry competition; that firm, dyad,
and network levels of analysis assist in “seeing”
competitors before they strike; and that indirect
competitors are “profilable.” Our methodology nar-
rows the theory–practice gap (Kryscynski & Ulrich,
2015)—segmenting indirect competitors before they
become direct rivals is vital for reducing a firm’s
vulnerability.
BACKGROUND
Competitive encounters do not emerge randomly,
which is why competitor identification and its funda-
mental question—i.e., who are a focal firm’s rivals?—
are central to CD research (Gur & Greckhamer, 2019;
Withers, Ireland, Miller, Harrison, & Boss, 2018).
The AMC framework is instrumental in this area be-
cause it explains that a firm can react to rivals or initi-
ate a competitive move when it is aware of a threat
or opportunity to strike and has the motivation and
capability to act or respond (Chen, 1996; Smith et al.,
2001; Yu & Cannella, 2007). Chen and Miller (2012)
detailed the relevance of the AMC framework in di-
verse contexts—e.g., competitive interactions, strate-
gic repertoires, multimarket competition, competitor
analysis, and competitive perceptions. The awareness
construct is a conceptual instrument for understand-
ing how firms detect rivals in diverse contexts, such
as market entry (Baum & Korn, 1996; Haveman &
Nonnemaker, 2000; Markman&Waldron, 2014),merg-
ers and acquisitions (M&As) (Haleblian, McNamara,
Dykes, & Kolev, 2012), exits (Girma, Greenaway, &
Kneller, 2003), and even firm closures (Headd, 2003).
Despite ample research on the motivation and ca-
pability constructs (Bennett & Pierce, 2016; Hsieh,
Tsai, & Chen, 2015; Pacheco & Dean, 2015; Sirmon,
Hitt, Arregle, & Campbell, 2010), studies on the
awareness construct remain limited (Guo, Yu, &
Gimeno, 2017).This is aproblem, because awareness
not only precedes the motivation and capability to
act, but also guides firms’ attention and intelligence-
gathering efforts before rivalry ensues (Chen, Su, &
Tsai, 2007). In the absence of prescient awareness,
even a highly motivated and capable firm will miss
competitive signals (Withers et al., 2018) or struggle
to defend itself (Guo et al., 2017). Insufficient or
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misguided awareness interferes with the discern-
ment of friends from foes (Sytch & Tatarynowicz,
2014), impedes the prioritization of threat, hampers
the matching of competitive threats with adequate
motivation and capability to react, and generally
escalates the cost of competition. However, when
firms are well aware of prebattle threats, they can
better channel their motivation and capabilities to
preempt, face, or avoid impending hostility (Chen
et al., 2007).
Unable to deliver on the predictive intent of
the awareness construct, but hoping at least to
reduce the misclassification of rivals, AMC studies
select samples from narrow sets of rivals within
well-defined industry precincts or strategic groups
(e.g., Smith, Grimm, Wally, & Young, 1997). The
profiling of rivals based on industry membership
aligns with the assumption that firms are aware of
competitive threats, but we worry that it keeps the
awareness construct underdeveloped and less use-
ful for prebattle identification of new rivals, espe-
cially those from other industries or distant indirect
competitors. In addition, competitive landscapes are
more accurately framed as arenas (McGrath, 2013),
as they do not always alignwith industry boundaries
and rivalry is often not confined to standard industry
classification (SIC) codes or market boundaries—
e.g., the motivation or capability to compete do not
vanish just because rivals represent unrelated in-
dustries (Markman, Gianiodis, & Buchholtz, 2009).
Consider a few examples of cross-industry, multi-
sided rivalry: When Amazon started selling cloud
computing services, it suddenly began to compete
with Microsoft, Google, Salesforce, and IBM, and
now competes with USPS, FedEx, and UPS in re-
lation to its delivery service. Similarly, Uber, Lyft,
and taxi firms are “typical” rivals, but when Uber
started to deliver packages it became a rival to
FedEx, UPS, andUSPS.We infuse theorywith real-
life examples because as long as competitor iden-
tification research and the awareness construct
remain focused on single-sided competition and
locked by an industry point of view, such “anom-
alies” will continue to blindside scholars and
firms.
Seeing beyond direct rivals and the development
of awareness cues to profile indirect competitors
necessitates new perspectives, specializedmethods,
and a consideration of the interdependence be-
tween direct rivals and indirect competitors, in-
cluding the rivals of a focal firm’s rivals, and so on.
Though competition is relational, most studies
have overlooked how competitive ties span different
levels of analysis (Chen & Miller, 2015; Gimeno,
2004; Li, Eden, Hitt, & Ireland, 2008; Madhavan,
Gnyawali, & He, 2004; Skilton & Bernardes, 2015;
Tsai, Su, & Chen, 2011). That is, rivals form dyads
that are in turn embedded in higher network levels
(triads, tetrads, etc.), so our tenet is that by blending
firm-, dyad-, and network-level views to capture
firm movement (e.g., altered ties that shift the
structure of networks), we can develop a hostility
profile to predict which indirect competitors today
might become direct rivals tomorrow. Our arena
view affords a more prescient awareness construct
for profiling indirect competitors, plus we in-
troduce a novel methodology to address the short-
comings of nonrelational studies to multilevel
analysis.
We explain the contributions and define key
constructs below, but for added clarity, and as a
prelude to the theory section, Figure 1 depicts the
conceptual model. Four cues triangulate the hos-
tility profile: diversification, asymmetric pressure,
convergence, and degree of separation. At the firm
level, diversified firms are likely to face competitive
encounters, and at the dyadic level, asymmetric
pressure (i.e., the differential exposure to competi-
tive pressure) is a significant predictor of competitive
encounters. At the network level, convergence—i.-
e., the encroachment of markets upon each other—is
associated with competitive encounters. The first
three awareness cues (i.e., diversification, asymmet-
ric pressure, and convergence) define the inclusion
criteria for possible hostility. A final awareness cue,
the degree of separation between firms, is the exclu-
sion criterion, showing that indirect competitorswho
are four or more degrees of separation away from a
focal firm are unlikely to become direct rivals. Col-
lectively, these cuesdefine thehostilityprofile,which
is the higher conceptual raison d’être construct in our
study.
THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES
Asnoted, rivals formdyads, triads, etc.Mirroring this
logic, our hypotheses start at the firm level, followedby
the dyadic and finally network levels. We also begin
with a firm-level awareness cue because firms are the
most basic actors in competitive encounters.
Diversification: A Firm-Level Awareness Cue
Several firm-level attributes might predict com-
petitive encounters; however, given the early
conceptual stage regarding the development of
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awareness cues and the need for a reliable, industry-
unallied cue that correlates with firmmovement, we
focus on diversification—the extent to which a firm
expands the scope of its operation, products, or ser-
vices beyond its core business, market, or industry.
Serving also as a shock absorber, diversification as-
sists firms with adaptation to changing market con-
ditions (Davis, Diekmann, & Tinsley, 1994). This can
reduce the power of buyers, suppliers, product sub-
stitutes, and rivals, and it also attenuates the adverse
impactof seasonal fluctuationswhileenhancing the fit
of resources and capabilities with growth-enhancing
opportunities. Diversification research has focused
on neither awareness cues nor profiling indirect
competitors, but it has offered some insights into the
diversification–rivalry link. For example, Haleblian
et al. (2012) showed that diversification shields a firm
from competition, Gimeno (2004) and Haveman and
Nonnemaker (2000) reported that diversified firms are
less aggressive and less vulnerable to cross-market
retaliation, and Miller and Chen (1994) found that
diversified firms arouse competitive actions. Despite
this limited and not yet converging research, we
evince that because diversification is a strong pre-
dictor of cross-industrymovement (Delios &Beamish,
1999; Rumelt, 1974; Santalo & Becerra, 2008)—and is
a stable and observable attribute—it can serve as a
reliable awareness cue for competitive encounters
(Wiersema & Bowen, 2008).
Highly diversified firms tend to be expansionary
even if growth opportunities are outside theirmarkets
(Delios & Beamish, 1999; McGrath, 2013; Penrose,
1959; Rumelt, 1974), which means wide movements
both upstream (into manufacturing and supply-chain
providers in factor markets) and downstream (toward
buyers andendusers inproductmarkets) (Priem,Li,&
Carr, 2012). In addition, firm movement increases
cross-industry encounters with new rivals (Withers
et al., 2018). Relatedly, diversified firms achieve
synergies from cross-market and cross-industry ac-
quisitions, and again such movements often bring
encounters with unfamiliar rivals (Markman et al.,
2009; Ye, Priem, & Alshwer, 2012). Unlike their
undiversified counterparts, diversified firms allocate
more resources to subsidize their forays into adjacent,
even dissimilar markets, suggesting that they stand to
face new rivals. Expansive market entry and cross-
sectoral movement put diversified firms on a more
adversarial path with rivals, some of whichmay have
nochoicebut to fight back if theyhaveno replacement
market into which to retreat (Shen & Villas-Boas,
2010; Upson, Ketchen, Connelly, & Ranft, 2012).
Whenhighlydiversified firmscontribute to landscape
shifts and market convergence, their movement can
be quite destabilizing (Schmidt, Makadok, & Keil,
2016). Thus, their large budgets and expansion needs
explain why diversified firms make wide moves and
consequently face players they have not previously
encountered.
These distinct properties of diversified firms are
not entirely novel, but their role as a precursor to
competition is certainly new to CD research and the
AMC framework in particular. Thus, we make the
following prediction:
Hypothesis 1. The higher the diversification level of
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Asymmetric Pressure: A Dyad-Level
Awareness Cue
Arobusthostilityprofile requires triangulating cues,
sowe expand the study to examinewhichpair of firms
might face each other competitively (Baum & Korn,
1999; Smith et al., 2001). Several dyad-level constructs
could play a role, including differences in resource
endowment (Chen & Miller, 2012), market depen-
dence (Pacheco & Dean, 2015), and spheres of influ-
ence (Chen, 1996; Gimeno, 2004), to name a few. Such
constructs are useful for profiling existing rivals, but
are too myopic to predict the formation of new en-
counters because they overlook the interrelations
among firms and the wider landscape in which firms
are embedded (i.e., their positions and pressure they
face prior to hostile encounters). Marrying the con-
cepts of competitive asymmetry (Chen &Miller, 2012)
and competitive pressure (D’Aveni, 2002), we redirect
attention to asymmetric pressure—i.e., the differential
exposure to the cumulative competitive pressure from
all competitors. Imagining an aerial view of competi-
tive landscapesmight assist in visualizing asymmetric
pressure. If Firms A and B are embedded in the same
network of direct and indirect competitors, but Firm
B’s arrangement ismore engulfing andmore proximal,
then Firm B faces stronger competitive pressure
(D’Aveni, 2002; Hsieh & Vermeulen, 2014).
This cue is revelatory for twomain reasons. First, as a
macro construct, asymmetric pressure accounts for the
number of direct and indirect competitors, their ar-
rangementandproximityvis-à-visadyad.Unlikedirect
rivals, indirect competitors are, by definition, farther
away from focal firms, but cumulatively they can gen-
erate immense competitive pressure as they are more
numerous than direct rivals. They are also less pre-
dictable—i.e., they come from more distant territories,
have unfamiliar profiles, rely on atypical resource-
capability mixes and use different logic—so the com-
petitivepressure theycreate isneither trivialnorbenign
(Withers et al., 2018). Second, as noted above, because
prior studies have taken a static view that is often mar-
ket- or industry-based, they have become too myopic
to see that dyads are embedded in a wider, multi-
sided, interdependent, and dynamic environment. The
asymmetric pressure construct is more encompassing
as it considers not only each dyad but also the sur-
rounding, cumulative threats from all competitors—
direct and indirect, regardless of industrymembership.
Thus, dyadic relations are better understoodwithin the
wider competitive pressure that focal firms face.
Several rationales have suggested that a strong asym-
metry in competitive pressure precedes the formation of
competitive dyads; e.g., the greater the pressure, the
more resources firms must revert away from growth-
enhancingfunctionsandintodefensiveneeds(McGrath,
Chen, & MacMillan, 1998; Withers et al., 2018). In ad-
dition, when firms divert resources they erode their
momentum, limit their profits, and admit their vulner-
ability, to the further benefit of rivals (Markman et al.,
2009). In fact,competitivepressure isoneof thestrongest
forces to shapecompetitivebehavior, andM&Aresearch
has corroborated that when competitive pressure in-
tensifies, firms become even more vulnerable to attacks
(Rogan & Sorenson, 2014). Just as acute competitive
pressure suboptimizes a firm’s resource allocation,
erodes its momentum, and reveals its vulnerability,
minimal competitive pressure affords greater strategic
andoperational agility.Givenachoice, then, firms strike
atmorevulnerableplayers rather than those facingequal
or less competitive pressure (all else being equal).
To recap, asymmetrical competitive pressure is an
intuitive construct for explaining why firms are moti-
vated to compete notwith equally exposed targets but
with those facing greater competitive pressure; hence,
this cue is critical for triangulating the hostility profile.
Thus:
Hypothesis 2. Asymmetric pressure between firms in
a dyad is positively related to the likelihood of com-
petitive encounters.
Network-Level Awareness Cues
Firms are not isolated islands. Instead, they are em-
bedded in networks, so the morphology of networks
can offer clues about who stands to compete with
whom. Network-level cues, in particular, assist by re-
vealing multisided and cross-industry competition.
Network studies on collaboration have used the con-
ceptof embeddedness toexplain several benefits, often
with the centrality and openness constructs. However,
in competition networks, the goal is to reveal how
embeddedness is associated with increased vulnera-
bility, so we explain why convergence and the degree
of separation between firms (two network-level
awareness cues) also demarcate the hostility profile.
Convergence. The evolution of any competitive
landscape—e.g., markets, industries, or arenas—
entails a dynamic interplay among firms that simul-
taneously creates and dissolves collaborative and
competitive ties between them, thus affecting firms’
actions (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). We study all-sided
competitive encounters not only because research
has often overlooked these engagements, but mainly
because—as noted above—dyads are embedded in
triads, which are embedded in tetrads, etc., and such
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agglomerated contexts can shed considerable light on
which indirect competitors might become direct ri-
vals. We stress network convergence—which occurs
when technologies, capabilities, firms, industries, or
landscapes coalesce—as it acknowledges firm move-
ment and thus helps to predict which indirect com-
petitors can become direct rivals. For instance, the
Internet and fungibility of technology erode industry
boundaries, facilitate firm movement, and create in-
terindustry convergence through transitivity (a term
used when a rival of a focal firm’s rival becomes a
direct rival of the focal firm).2
The root causes of network convergence and thus
transitivity among competitors vary: Diffused syn-
ergies, bundled services, integrated products, in-
teroperable technology, and the rise of multisided
platforms are all as much related to convergence as
are the proliferation of diversified firms and the
surge in asymmetric competitive pressure (Schmidt
et al., 2016). Research has shown that convergence is
associated with not only cross-industry M&As, Joint
Ventures, and alliances, but also with firms’ exploi-
tation of customer-specific synergies, and the trans-
fer of competencies across markets (Desarbo et al.,
2006; Manral & Harrigan, 2018; Priem et al., 2012;
Uzunca, 2018). In addition, when firms develop a
wider user base and apply capabilities across mar-
kets, competitive landscapes also converge. As a re-
sult, relations, power dynamics, and entire network
morphologies change, so convergence is linked to
vulnerability as well. For example, manufacturers of
digital cameras and GPS units overlooked the con-
vergence of smartphones; IT companies blindsided
automakers; and now the financial industry and even
nations are scrambling to react to converging (and
encroaching) blockchain-based businesses.3
Marrying the concept of network convergence with
the transitivity principle, our logic is straightforward:
Convergence is a prescient awareness cue because
when landscapes, technologies, competencies, and cus-
tomer bases coalesce, they reduce the technological,
domain, or geographical “distance” between players
and increase the likelihood of transitive encounters
where indirect competitors suddenly become direct
rivals (Gargiulo, Ertug, & Galunic, 2009). Thus:
Hypothesis 3a. Convergence is positively related to
the likelihood of competitive encounters.
Degree of separation. Unlike distance in geo-
graphical space,which ismeasured inmeters or yards,
in network space a degree of separation refers to the
spatial gaps between firms, such as number and
lengths of connections or paths (i.e., those that form
dyads, triads, tetrads, pentads, etc.; see our “Methods”
section). The separation construct, then, refers neither
to geographical distance (only) nor to a single dyadic
tie, but instead to the substructures of a competitive
landscape. The separation construct is a valuable cue
to CD scholars because firms are embedded in eco-
systems where their movement impacts the actions
taken and tension experienced by all players (Dattée,
Alexy,&Autio, 2018), yet firms cannot andneednot be
aware of every competitor, so demarcating the bound
of thehostilityprofile is clearly important.Recognizing
interdependences, CD scholars have applied network
perspectives (Gimeno, 2004; Madhavan et al., 2004),
and such effort confirms the coinfluence of local net-
work structure on rivals’ perceptions (Tsai et al., 2011)
andmarket entries (Hsieh & Vermeulen, 2014; Skilton
& Bernardes, 2015). Though clearly helpful, these
studies have stopped short of capturing the whole
network structure (e.g., “network centralization” in
cooperative networks [see Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999]),
which is crucial for bounding the hostility profile.
Thus, the degree of separation cue not only captures
the substructural tendencies of the competitive land-
scape to inform awareness, but also sets an upper limit
beyond which awareness is no longer needed.
There are several justifications for bounding the
hostility profile. Among these is the obvious challenge
ofscale-basedcomplexityas thenumberofconnections
to all other firms increases.4 Profiling all indirect com-
petitors in a network and considering their degrees of
2 Transitivity: The situation that occurs when Firm A
competes with Firm B, and Firm B competes with Firm C,
and then Firm A competes with Firm C.
3 Often, geographic proximity can confound or contrib-
ute to the concept of network convergence. Our analyses
control for this effect, but it is helpful to note that as a
network-level awareness cue, convergence neither implies
nor requires geographic proximity. The advent of cloud
computing—from software-as-a-service pioneers (e.g.,
Salesforce) to platform- and infrastructure-as-a-service
providers (e.g., Amazon Web Services, Google Cloud
Platform)—has decoupled service provision from a firm’s
physical location. Naturally, this is not the case for every
competitive arena, yet it clarifies why network conver-
gence is distinct from geographic proximity.
4 In a network of all noncommon competitors, the
number of indirect competitors at a given degree of sepa-
ration (d) increases exponentially in proportion to the av-
erage number of competitors (c), or cd. For example, if each
firm in the network had three unique competitors (c 5 3),
then the focal firm would have three rivals at d 5 1; nine
indirect competitors at d 5 2; 27 at d 5 3; 81 at d 5 4, etc.
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separation from each other is daunting cognitively
and computationally (March & Olsen, 1976; March
& Simon, 1958; Ocasio, 1997). Another issue is that
the transitive-convergence mechanism noted earlier
(Hypothesis 3a) will deteriorate, or even break apart,
over more rungs of a competition network. Parentheti-
cally, strategic management scholars have used the
separation concept to study diverse phenomena. For
instance, capabilities and resources can be redeployed
across related markets (Penrose, 1959), making M&As
and entry less risky under fewer degrees of separation.
Conversely, higher degrees of separation are often as-
sociated with incompatibility in capability redeploy-
ment, and higher management costs—e.g., unrelated
diversification (Ng, 2007) or entry into distant markets
(Gruber, MacMillan, & Thompson, 2013).
Returning to CD research and the degree of sepa-
ration to bound the hostility profile, we argue that,
regardless of landscape substructual complexity and
transitivity, scouting or profiling far-removed in-
direct competitors is unneeded because highly sep-
arated players are generally unlikely to close in and
become direct rivals. The higher-order conceptual
aim, of course, is to define a boundary condition for
the hostility profile—to find the “Ultima Thule”
network rung(s); the rungs after which awareness
will no longer be applicable. Developing this ele-
ment of our theory is critical because, as noted above,
the AMC framework provides neither empirical
certitude nor conceptual logic to delineate a cutoff
that separates indirect competitorswho pose a threat
from bona fide nonrivals. Thus, how far—in terms of
network rungs—could a focal firm realistically be
and yet still clash with its indirect competitors? The
absence of theory and lack of empirical evidence on
this issue call for a general prediction of a negative
association between the degree of separation and
competitive encounters, and we await the data
analysis to specify the precise degree of separation.
In conceptual terms, the separation construct does
not define the point at which awareness becomes
unreliable; instead, it delineates where awareness is
simply no longer needed. Thus:
Hypothesis 3b. There is a negative association be-
tween the degree of separation among firms in a net-
work and the likelihood of competitive encounters.
METHODS
Competition Network
Before delving into the data and variables, it is
helpful to elaborate on network terminology and
notation. First, rarely do firms either cooperate or
compete exclusively; they do both, and collaborative
and competitive relations are not simply opposite
but quite distinct (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001;
Markman et al., 2009; Skilton & Bernardes, 2015;
Sytch & Tatarynowicz, 2014). The vast majority of
network studies have analyzed collaborative ties or,
more recently,multiplex ties, but fewer have focused
primarily on the structure of competitive relations (a
notable exception is Skilton & Bernardes, 2015). We
test for cooperative ties as well, but find that com-
petitive ties are most relevant for awareness because
they reveal threats that collaborative ties tend to
mask. Second, cooperation and competition net-
works (Borgatti & Lopez-Kidwell, 2011; Gimeno,
2004; Li et al., 2008) often require different empirical
methodologies. Specifically, Borgatti and Lopez-
Kidwell (2011) grouped networks into two main
models. Flow models treat ties as conduits for the
flow of information and other resources among net-
work members (Granovetter, 1973), whereas archi-
tecture models focus on more tangible outcomes (or
costs) that accrue to networkmembers based on their
position in and adjacency to specific neighbors, their
neighbors’ neighbors, etc. (Cook & Emerson, 1978;
Cook, Emerson, Gillmore, & Yamagishi, 1983).
Henceforth,we rely onnetwork architecturemodels,
which are better suited to studying adversarial re-
lations as firms maneuver amid competitors, and
thus can advance the awareness construct.
Finally, in Figure 2, focal firm A competes with
firms B and C in industry I. Firm C also competes
with firm E in industry II, whereas firm E competes
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separation between firms i and j (dijÞ is the fewest
number of “steps” (i.e., shortest path length) between
them. For firmsA andB,dAB5 1; forA andE,dAE5 2
(second-degree indirect competitors, path: A–C–E);
for A and F, dAF 5 3 (third-degree indirect competi-
tors, path: A–C–E–F).
With Figure 2 in mind, consider indirect competi-
tors that become direct rivals. If, for example, firm E
engages focal firm A, then the competitive encounter
between A and E causes two major changes. First, a
three-cycle rivalry (A–C–E–A) is created among the
triad (A, C, E)—an instance of convergence that in-
creases competitive transitivity. Second, the degree of
separation between focal firmA and firmEdrops from
two to one—their relationship changes from second-
degree (indirect) competitors to first-degree (direct) ri-
vals. Competitive dyads or triads might seem typical,
but they are not the only competitive configurations.
Less studied, yet more blindsiding, firm F may com-
pete with focal firm A, which would introduce a four-
cycle rivalry (A–C–E–F–A), dropping the degree of
separation between A and F from dAF 5 3 to dAF 5 1.
Sucha tetradic configuration illustrates anunexpected
competitive encounter when the entry of a distant
player creates a k-cycle rivalry for k$ 4. The move-
ment of indirect competitors and their conversion into
direct rivals occurs quite often (e.g., smartphones dis-
rupting the market for GPSs and digital cameras), but
withdecreasing likelihoodas theirdegreeof separation
grows, which we address shortly.
Data and Research Setting
Extant CD research has tended to use data fromwell-
defined, homogenous, relatively stable, and regulated
industries;however, to assess theawarenesscuesunder
typical conditions we study rivalry in a more repre-
sentative landscape (Gur & Greckhamer, 2019) with
data spanning 10 years (2007–2016). This context is
quite revealing. First, our firms are involved in theCEM
arena,whichrepresentsadiversemixof firmsizes,ages,
and strategic orientations. These includemultiproduct,
multinational generalists suchas IBM,SAP,Oracle, and
Adobe; “unicorns” (i.e., private firmswithvaluations of
$1billion, suchasQualtrics andMedallia); and smaller,
single-product startups. Second, unlike many CD
studies that have oversampled public companies, our
sample ismore inclusive andquite representativeof the
typicalprivate–public ratio:94%areprivate, suggesting
thatours is reflectiveofmanybusiness landscapes.This
arena is also dynamic, evident in a compound annual
growth rate of 19% (Thompson, 2015). Finally, because
CEM firms span several industries, markets and
technologies—enterprise social listening, enterprise
social networks, enterprise feedback management, dig-
ital experience platforms, and customer analytics sol-
utions—they offer a realistic context, including entries
and exits, and show network movements including
convergence and divergence.
Deviating from past studies that have relied on SIC
codes, we obtained our data from CrunchBase, a busi-
ness graph database that collects, verifies, and validates
competitive encounters and venture investment data
from technology news articles.5 Because firms collabo-
rate and compete, we added data on cooperative re-
lations (alliances and joint ventures) from Thompson
Securities Data Company PlatinumTM and compared
firm SIC codes from Compustat. Finally, we collected
additional data for firm-level controls from Hoover’s
Mergent Intellect database and PrivCo (Private Com-
pany) database, and dyad-level controls came from
Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings database,
Compustat, and CrunchBase.
Dependent Variable
Competitive encounters. The dependent variable
(DV) yijt measures whether a competitive encounter
occurred, taking the value of 1 if firms i and j had a
competitive encounter in period t, and 0 otherwise. As
firms rarely compete with all other firms at any given
moment, competitor identification studies are more re-
vealing if they follow focal firms over an extended pe-
riod of time. We analyzed 15,824,693 dyad-year
observations with 142,446 competitive encounters re-
lated to 25 focal firms and their respective 10,232 direct
rivalsandindirectcompetitors (2,920uniquefirms)over
a 10-year period (2007 to 2016). For context, from 2007
to 2016,Qualtrics (oneof our 25 focal firms) faced a total
of 7,489 competitive encounterswith 531 direct rivals
and indirect competitors who represent 29 distinct
four-digit SIC codes. For each focal firm, the cohort
was chosen to include firms within three degrees
of separation from that focal firm in any year, but be-
cause firms move, the degrees of separation collec-
tively ranged from one to eight throughout the
timeframe.6
5 CrunchBasewas createdbyTechCrunch in2007, and it
has operated independently since 2015. https://techcrunch.
com/2015/09/22/aolverizon-completes-spinout-of-crunchbase-
funded-by-emergence-capital/
6 The three degrees of separation threshold is far enough
to capture unexpected competitive encounters, but still
within reasonable cognitive andcomputational limitations
(March, 1991; March & Simon, 1958).
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Independent Variables
Diversification.Wemeasured diversification (the
extent to which a firm expands the scope of its op-
eration, or products or services, beyond its core







In Equation (1),Gst is the groupof firms in the s
th space
towhich the competitors of firm i belong in time t, and
nst is the number of other firms in the s
th space in time
t.7 This firm-level diversification measure captures
dependence upon the competition network structure,
creating a foundational awareness cue that reflects the
interdependence among arena spaces.
Asymmetric pressure. We operationalize the asym-
metric pressure (the differential exposure to cumula-
tive competitive pressure) between firms i and j in
period t as follows:
Asymmetric Pressureijt
5 jCitða,bÞ2Cjtða,bÞj, "ij (2)
In Equation (2), Citða,bÞ5+nj51ða1bCjtÞyijt ,"ji
is the competitive pressure (based on Bonacich’s
[1987] centrality measure) of firm i in period t. This
has a unique interpretation that we introduce here for
adversarial networks with competitive relations—in
which dyads compete for resources from a third party
(for this measure’s origins in adversarial relations of
exchange networks, cf. Cook et al. [1983] and Gulati
and Sytch [2007]). Specifically, the measure captures
the degree to which firm i is exposed to competitive
pressure, considering the influence of not only its di-
rect rivals, but their rivals, and so on, cumulatively
(Borgatti & Lopez-Kidwell, 2011). The absolute dif-
ference in firm competitive pressures therefore cap-
tures dyadic asymmetric pressure in an undirected
network. The scaling parameter a can be computed
implicitly, but especially important is the decay pa-
rameter b, which must be chosen to control both the
type and distance of the pressure effect. Larger ab-
solute values of b indicate a distant network effect,
while smaller absolute values denote a local effect.
The sign of b captures the type of network ties, with
positive values (b. 0) representing the information-
sharing or resource flows of cooperative networks,
and negative values (b , 0) representing the com-
petition or bargaining of adversarial networks. Our
competitionnetwork obviously calls for a negativeb.
We expect a distant network effect suited to broad-
ening the scope of awareness, and a range of other
negative b values are also tested in the “Robustness
checks” section.
Convergence. As noted, convergence is the ten-
dency of technologies, capabilities, firms, and indus-
tries to coalesce. The network statistic of convergence
captures the endogenous dependence of the competi-












The measure adds 1 whenever all three encounters
are present together, forming a three-cycle rivalry.
Degree of separation. Lastly, the degree of sepa-
ration between firms expands on the convergence
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Recognizing that a k-cycle term may proxy the
effect of k2 1 degrees of separation, we operation-
alize the substructures of a competitive landscape
using counts of network subgraphs (cyclic tetrads,
pentads, etc.). By adding k-cycle predictors in
a range of values for k, we can use the pattern
of coefficients to represent nontautologically the
association between network-level rivalry config-
urations and the likelihood of individual competi-
tive encounters.8 The strength of the relationship
depends upon how many configurations the po-
tential competitive encounterwould contribute; for
example, if four cycles are significantly positive in
the network, then competitive encounters that cre-
ate more endogenous four cycles have a higher
likelihood of occurring. Research on the cycle cen-
sus in exponential random graph models (ERGMs)
(Butts, 2006) has shown that decreasing coefficients
that eventually become negative for larger significant
k values indicate a negative association between de-
gree of separation and competitive encounters (as we
hypothesized).
7 The term “space” refers to a competition network
community,where competitive relations are definedwhen
firms were seen as rivals by news articles, customers, an-
alysts, and other firm outsiders (Gur & Greckhamer, 2019).
8 Since dyads at one degree of separation are rivals by
definition, yijt 51⇔dijt 51, the network-level degree of
separation proxy may circumvent an otherwise tautologi-
cal association at the dyad level.
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Control Variables
We used several firm-, dyad-, and network-level
controls that could affect competitive encounters.
These controls contain exogenous contextual factors
and network-related variables.
Firm-level controls. The liability of newness and
smallness (Freeman,Carroll, &Hannan, 1983) is based
on the view that a firm’s ability to handle more com-
petitive ties is correlated with its age and size. Thus,
we include a control for firm age, and, accounting for
the impact of size (Chen & Hambrick, 1995; Miller &
Chen,1994),wealso include thenumberof employees
and sales revenue. Finally, we include competitive
pressure as a firm-level control variable.
Dyad-level controls. As dyad-level controls for
asymmetric pressure (Hypothesis 2), we used the ab-
solute difference of firm ages, firm ownership status
homophily (the tendency of firmswith similar traits to
encounter each other), and firm branch multimarket
contact (MMC). The literature has corroborated the
effect of mutual forbearance on rivalry, showing
that location can influence whether firms compete or
forbear; therefore, we controlled for MMC (Gimeno &
Woo, 1999; Korn & Baum, 1999). As the firm branch
MMC term does not fully capture the necessary
exogenous contextual factors for single-branch firms
(Lusher, Koskinen, & Robins, 2013), we comple-
mented this termwith a control for headquarters’ (HQ)
geographic region homophily. We also controlled
for the influence of shared investors on competition
(Connelly, Lee, Tihanyi, Certo, & Johnson, 2019) and
category relatedness on competitive sensemaking
(Cattani, Porac, & Thoma, 2017; Porac, Thomas,
Wilson, Paton, & Kanfer, 1995), which is further
complicated in arenas with unclear boundaries. We
computed the category relatedness control based on
similarity of the firms’ category vectors sourced from
CrunchBase’s list of 714 categories of products (“craft
beer” and “micro-lending”) and technologies (“facial
recognition” and “e-signature”).
Network-level controls. The number of competi-
tive encounters in the network is conventionally in-
cluded in ERGMs as a baseline “network constant”
effect, similar to the intercept of a linear model. A net-
work statistic for “geometrically weighted edgewise
shared competitors” is included to control for the
shared competitor distribution and prevent model de-
generacy, which occurs if all ties are predicted to equal
1 or 0 (Hunter, Handcock, Butts, Goodreau, & Morris,
2008). Additionally, the “geometrically weighted
competitors” statistic is used to capture remaining
Markov dependence assumptions (Lusher et al., 2013).
Finally, to account for the inertia of network evolution
(cf. McKelvey, 1997), we controlled for both a linear
trend in the number of encounters over time and an
autoregressive networkmemory (Cranmer, Heinrich, &
Desmarais, 2014). For the latter effect, we used a net-
work statistic called temporal stability, which counts
the number of stable dyads (i.e., both continued rivalry
and continued nonrivalry) between periods and thus
controls for the persistence of absent ties—a preferable
control over alternatives including temporal autocor-
relation (counts only the persisting ties) and network
innovation (counts only the newly created ones)
(Leifeld, Cranmer, & Desmarais, 2018). We tested for a
laggedDVeffect andgot comparable results to temporal
dyadic stability.
Analyses
An adequate profiling of indirect competitors re-
quires methodological capabilities that are new to
management research.Akeyproblem is that relational
data are necessary to capture all the awareness cues
simultaneously, and yet these interdependent obser-
vations are not suited tononrelationalmethods—such
as ordinary least squares regression or generalized
linear models—as these classic techniques assume
independent observations and thus produce biased
results onnetworkdata (Kim,Howard,&Boeker, 2016;
Lusher et al., 2013). PriorCDresearchhas generallynot
considered a relational perspective, ignoring interde-
pendenceamongvariablesatdifferent levels (Contractor,
Wasserman, & Faust, 2006), so hypothesis testing
retained the assumption of independent observations
(a notable exception is Madhavan et al., 2004). To over-
come these obstacles, we use ERGMs, which frame hy-
pothesesintermsof theprobabilitiesofgraphrealizations
with specific structural tendencies (Contractor et al.,
2006; on the methodological advantages of ERGMs in
strategic management cf., Kim et al., 2016).
ERGMs account for network dependence and offer
flexibility for defining multilevel network sufficient
statistics as predictors. However, to address com-
petitive encounters over time, our longitudinal
competition network requires an extension to the
ERGMspecification, called temporalERGM (TERGM)
that can account for trends in factors driving com-
petitive encounters (Hanneke, Fu, & Xing, 2010).
Hence, we use the version of TERGM described
by Desmarais and Cranmer (2012) and implemented
by Leifeld et al. (2018). For analyzing a hostility pro-
file, the TERGM is preferable to the primary alterna-
tive model for longitudinal network analysis—stochastic
actor-oriented model (SAOM) (Snijders, 1996)—because
2019 1881Downing, Kang, Markman
the latter’s assumption of plausible connections to all
nodes implies ubiquitous prior awareness and precludes
application to networks larger than a few hundred nodes
(Snijders, Van de Bunt, & Steglich, 2010; for theoretical
and empirical comparisons of TERGM and SAOM, cf.
Leifeld & Cranmer, 2019).
TERGM estimates are computed via maximum
pseudo-likelihood estimation (MPLE) with boot-
strapped confidence intervals (Desmarais & Cranmer,
2012). AlthoughMarkov ChainMonte CarloMaximum
LikelihoodEstimation(MCMLE) isacommonchoice for
ERGMestimation insmallnetworks (e.g., less thana few
hundred nodes with only one period), it is computa-
tionally impractical for large, multiperiod networks
(Schmid & Desmarais, 2017). The MPLE is a more
efficient alternative—a robust multivariateM-estimator
for which bootstrap resampling allows consistent, un-
biased confidence intervals while still avoiding
the convergence issues and computational cost of
MCMLE (Desmarais & Cranmer, 2012).
Predicting individual encounters. An ERGM
prescribes “how likely it is to add or delete a tie for a
pair of actors given everything else” (Lusher et al.,
2013:55).Thismeans that the logoddsofacompetitive
encounter between firms i and j in period t ðyijt 5 1Þ are
conditional on everything else—which, for a TERGM,
includes not only the covariates X t and model pa-
rameters u, but also the entire remainder of the current
competition network Ycijt (known as the “complement
of Yijt”) and the past competition network Y t2 1:
logit P
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In Equation (5), the “change statistics” dijtðgrÞ5
grðyijt 5 1, ycijtÞ2 grðyijt 5 0, ycijtÞ measure the differ-
ence of the “network statistic” gr if the competitive
encounter between dyad ðijÞ were to exist (yijt 5 1)
rather than not to exist (yijt 5 0) at time t (Wasserman
& Pattison, 1996).9 Each change statistic captures the
amount of endogenous or exogenous dependence be-
tween the hypothesized network statistic and the net-
work structure contributed by dyad ðijÞ in period t.
RESULTS
The results show that diversification, asymmetric
pressure, convergence, and degree of separation
(Hypotheses 1, 2, 3a and 3b, respectively) are asso-
ciated with competitive encounters; thus, all four
cues define the hostility profile as predicted. We
elaborate on these results below.
Competition Network TERGM Hypothesis Tests
Focusing on Qualtrics as a focal firm, Table 1
features the summary statistics and correlations for
the 7,489 competitive encounters based on the
network of 532 firms (2007–2016). Table 2 presents
the baseline model with control variables, fol-
lowed by Models 1–3 addressing all the hypothe-
ses, and finally the full model (Model 4). Table 2
presents the TERGM coefficients’ MPLE estimates
with confidence intervals from 2,000 bootstrap
resamples, below which we confirmed the in-
tervals had stabilized (Leifeld et al., 2018). Effects
are reported as significant when the 95% bootstrap
resampled confidence interval does not contain
zero.
SupportingHypothesis 1,Model 1 (Table 2) shows
that highly diversified firms face more competi-
tive encounters compared to less diversified firms.
Model 2 confirms that competitive encounters are
9 Network statistics at the firm and dyad levels are created
by interacting the covariate with the competitive encounters
to capture dependence on the structure of competition; specif-








"j i.However, at thenetwork levels (triad, tetrad, etc.), the
awareness cues are already computed from the structure of
competition, so the network statistics are defined by the
awareness cues themselves (e.g., g3 [ ConvergencetÞ.
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more likely among dyads with greater asymmetric
pressure, thus supporting Hypothesis 2. Consistent
with Hypothesis 3a, Model 3 shows that network-
wide convergence is significantly related to the
formation of competitive encounters. Model 3 and
Model 4 (the full model) are particularly revealing
for Hypothesis 3b: they show that while indirect
competitors at three degrees of separation can still
become direct rivals (four cycles), the greater sepa-
ration between fourth-degree indirect competitors
tends to have a suppressive effect on competitive
encounters (five cycles). Consistent withModels 1–3,
the full model (Table 2; Model 4) provides further
support for all the hypotheses.
Note that caution must be taken when interpret-
ing effect sizes for network models, since each
effect is conditional on the rest of the network.
Given this caveat, we offer some insight into the
effect of the awareness cues. Beginning with Hy-
pothesis 1, consider two potential competitive
encounters in the network that are identical in
all regards except one: diversification. One of the
potential encounters involves two firms with low
(16th percentile) total diversification, while the
other potential encounter involves two firms
with high (84th percentile) total diversification.
According to Equation (5), depending on the rest
of the network and assuming controls equal their
median values, the difference in diversification
would be associated with a 172% increase in the
probability of the high-diversification encounter
occurring over the low-diversification alternative,
on average. If the focal firm were a party in both
these potential encounters, then it might interpret
this difference as the increased likelihood of en-
countering the high-diversification indirect com-
petitor. Applying the same cautious interpretation
and assumptions for Hypothesis 2, the difference
from low to high asymmetric pressure between two
(otherwise identical) potential encounters would
be associated with an 80% increase in the proba-
bility of the high-asymmetry encounter occurring,
on average. Finally, considering the network-level
cues (Hypothesis 3), we interpret the difference be-
tween two potential encounters thatwould create zero
versusone rivalry cycles for convergence (three cycles),
third-degree separation (four cycles), and fourth-degree
separation (five cycles). These would be associated
with an 84% increase, 24% increase, and 2%decrease,
respectively, in the likelihood of the structurally en-
dogenous encounter occurring, relative to the alterna-
tive encounter that would not contribute to landscape
substructural dynamics.
The results reveal that third-degree indirect
competitors—the rivals of a focal firm’s direct rivals’
rivals—represent the “Ultima Thule” (i.e., the outer
bounds) within which indirect competitors become
direct rivals. After three degrees of separation (four
cycles), the association is either negative (fourth-
degree separation suppresses five-cycle encounters)
or no longer significant (fifth-degree or higher sepa-
ration has no association with randomly occurring
six-cycle or higher encounters). Put in conceptual
terms, CD scholars can see—for the first time—a
well-defined hostility profile in which competition
ensues and beyond which it does not. The hostility
profile entails direct rivals (of course), andup to and
including third-degree indirect competitors. The
profile uncovers a separation bound: After three
degrees of separation, the negative or insignificant
association does not merit awareness for competi-
tive encounters. As expected, the effect of the de-
gree of separation decreases with increased length
of cycles, from three cycles to four cycles to five
cycles. Thus, expanding awareness up to and in-
cluding third-degree indirect competitors makes
sense, but beyond that point the dearth of threat
from more separated players would render aware-
ness impractical.
Adding precision to guide scholarly research and
managerial action, Figure 3 features the competi-
tion network of Qualtrics in 2008 and 2016, with
quadrants A and B featuring aerial maps, and
quadrantsC andD showing segmentation graphs by
a degree of separation. In quadrants A and B, the
blue square presents Qualtrics while red circles
represent its competitive threats—firms with suffi-
ciently high probability of forming competitive
encounterswithQualtrics. Unfilled circles show all
other firms considered less threatening. An in-
teresting insight from these aerial maps is that some
adjacent firms may remain nonrivals despite their
tight proximity to the focal firm, even when con-
vergence causes distant indirect competitors to
become direct rivals. The visual depiction corrob-
orates that convergence and degree of separation
play distinct roles.
To further elaborate on competitive threats,
quadrants C and D use a degree of separation “filter”
that segments competitive threats into four group
types: direct rivals, expected indirect competitors,
unexpected indirect competitors, and nonrivals. Di-
rect rivals (one degree of separation) already engage
the focal firm so they require no elaboration. At two
degrees of separation, we find indirect competitors
whose threat may be expected because of transitive
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FIGURE 3
Aerial Maps and Segmentation Graphs of Competitive Threats over Time
2008 Aerial Maps 2016
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Notes:QuadrantsA andB show aerialmaps of Qualtrics (blue) and its rivals and indirect competitors, who are identified as the competitive
threats (red), meaning firms with high conditional probability of competitive encounters in 2008 and 2016. Quadrants C and D present the
conditional probabilities of competitive encounter (y-axis) and degree of separation (x-axis) for firms in the corresponding early period
(quadrantC, 2008) and late period (quadrantD, 2016). The firms that fit the hostility profile (red) in quadrants C andD encompass four distinct
segments: direct rivals (firms at onedegreeof separation fromQualtrics); expected indirect competitors (twodegrees of separation);unexpected
indirect competitors (threedegreesof separation), andnonrivals (more than threedegrees; firms that, onaverage, have little chance to encounter
Qualtrics). Note that the distribution of firms in each degree segment changes over time as the competition network evolves.
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convergence (Hypothesis 3a). Unexpected indirect
competitors, a group that CD research has tended to
overlook, are found at three degrees of separation. As
the network structure is conducive to convergence,
and indirect competitors still have a significant
probability of becoming direct rivals, this group of
firms (third-degree indirect competitors) poses the
highest blindsiding threat. Finally, at four or more
degrees of separation are the bona fide nonrivals,
who do not merit awareness since they, on average,
have no significant path to the focal firm. Because
nonrivals are beyond the threshold at which indirect
competitors become direct rivals, the hostility pro-
file reveals they merit little attention. In addition,
fromquadrantsC toD, the crowding effect shows that
distant indirect competitors come closer to the focal
firm and quite a few become direct rivals.
Goodness of Fit
The assessment of goodness of fit (GOF), which
testswhether the observeddatamatch the theoretical
predictions, is a protracted, rigorous process for
ERGMs that aims to capture the corresponding en-
dogenous dependencies in the full model (cf.,
Desmarais & Cranmer, 2012; Hunter et al., 2008;
Leifeld et al., 2018). To this end,we simulated 10,000
random networks from the parameters and cova-
riates of the fullmodel (Model 4), then used auxiliary
statistics computed from this simulated sample as a
baseline for comparison with the observed network
statistics, again from the full model. If the observed
network statistics align with the statistics computed
from the sample of randomnetworks, then themodel
is a good fit. The simulated distributions of “dyad-
wise shared competitors,” “edgewise shared com-
petitors,” and “degree” (i.e., number of competitors)
each revealed a good fit with our model, both in
terms of a visual assessment of GOF plots (available
upon request) and tests of group means: the simu-
lated frequencies of each value (ranging from 0 to 16)
of each auxiliary statistic confirm the similarity be-
tween the simulated and observed network with a
significance level of 0.05. Finally, the auxiliary sta-
tistic of “geodesic distance” (i.e., lowest degree of
separation) is also a very good fit in the range that is
our focus (path lengths up to 11); none are signifi-
cantlydifferent from the simulated sample. To recap,
the GOF assessment shows that our full model ade-
quately reproduces networks similar to the observed
data within the range of the auxiliary statistic dis-
tributions that are relevant for our focal firm’s com-
petition network.
Robustness Checks
Adding a layer of rigor, we conducted five ro-
bustness checks as detailed below (see Appendix A,
Tables A1–A4).
Model reproducibility. The use of a single focal
firm suits the task of competitor identification, but
raises concerns about the reproducibility and gen-
eralizability of the results for other firms. To address
this, we created competition networks for 24 other
focal firms (25 in total) that were rivals or competi-
tive threats of the first, then recomputed Model 4 for
each of these new focal-firm competition networks
(Table A1). Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 3a, and Hy-
pothesis 3b are consistent in sign and significance for
all 25 networks (100%), and Hypothesis 2 for 24 of
the networks (96%).
Diversification. We used the multilevel net-
work community algorithm (Blondel, Guillaume,
Lambiotte, & Lefebvre, 2008) to capture the degree of
diversification across firms with the hierarchical
distinction between inter- and intraspace ties. Five
other community algorithms were also tested (see
Table A2). Although they differ in the number of
network communities identified, the diversification
values computed from these community member-
ship outputs were all consistent with our measures.
Asymmetric pressure. The computation of dif-
ferential exposure to competitive pressure includes
each firm’s competitive pressure, which requires
setting the decay parameter (b) that controls how
distant effects impact firms. Primary results in
Table 2 use a distant network effect setting: b5 –0.4.
Since the results may be sensitive to this setting, we
reran TERGM Model 4 for the focal firm using the
other values from Bonacich (1987) that are also
theoretically suitable for a competition network
(20.1,20.2,20.3,20.5; see Table A3). The results of
all hypotheses are unchanged in sign and signifi-
cance regardless of the competitive pressure decay b
used.10
Degree of separation. We checked the effect of a
lower degree of separation threshold for competition
network cohort selection by reselecting the cohort
using a threshold of two degrees of separation (in-
stead of three) and then recomputed Model 4. As
Table A4 shows, the signs and significance of all
hypotheses remained unchanged despite including
10 The lower 95% confidence bound of asymmetric
pressure decreases (approaching zero) for smaller absolute
values of b, capturing less-distant effects, which supports
our use of a distant network effect setting for b.
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fewer firms (168 down from 532). Importantly, this
indicates that all awareness cues are robust to the
choice of threshold used in cohort selection; each
firm’s threshold should suit its own resources and
environment. However, there is still a limit to the
degree of separation firms need to consider—
additional analyses on larger k-cycles show that the
convergent effect has completely dissipated by five
degrees of separation (note the insignificant effects
for six cycles and higher).
Cooperative relations. Finally, checking the effect
of cooperationoncompetition (Sytch&Tatarynowicz,
2014), we retested Model 4 while controlling for co-
operative ties (alliances and joint ventures). As ex-
pected, the cooperative relation effect is negative
(i.e., suppressing competitive encounters). However,
this did not change the hypotheses; all remained
significant.
The consistency and reproducibility of the results
through the GOF tests and five robustness checks are
remarkable, but of course more research is needed
before our hostility profile is deemed empirically
generalizable and theoretically robust.
DISCUSSION
Early detection of competitive threats is hardly a
new imperative; yet, even under static market con-
ditions, spotting rivals before they strike is not a
trivial task, especially with the fungibility of tech-
nology; the blending of business, politics, and soci-
ety; and the formation of new business models and
multisided platforms. Still, thosewho can see farther
are better positioned to preempt, ally with, retreat,
defend against, or ignore would-be rivals in accor-
dance with their best interests. Following the doc-
trine that the enemy of my enemy is my friend, CD
research enhances our awareness of direct rivals
(Chen & Miller, 2012), but the ability to see which
indirect competitors are poised to become direct ri-
vals has remained underdeveloped. How, then, can
the awareness construct—the first in the AMC
framework—become more revelatory? To address
this question, we constructed competition networks
from six data sources to analyze 15,824,693 obser-
vations in the CEM arena over a 10-year period
(2007–2016). Of these, 142,446 were competitive
encounters between 25 focal firms and their
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respective 10,257 direct and indirect competitors
(2,920 unique firms).
Our profiling approach, datasets, and novel
methodology allowus to see further, andhencemake
several contributions to the SRF “New Ways of See-
ing.” First, as noted above, past studies have used an
industry prism and assumed that (i) firms compete
inside, but hardly across, their industry precincts
(Chen &Miller, 2012; Gur & Greckhamer, 2019); and
(ii) the awareness construct ismostly for considering
existing rivals, so indirect competitors have rarely
been profiled (Chen & Miller, 2015). Challenging
these dogmas, we use an arena view to capture cross-
industry movement and competitive encounters
that have been overlooked in the past. In addition,
acknowledging the fact that rivals are embedded in
dyads, triads, tetrads, etc., we develop a multilevel
hostility profile that classifies indirect competitors
according to their likelihoodofbecomingdirect rivals.
Second, the hostility profile signifies consensus-
shifting theorizing in CD research, as it proffers a pre-
dictive awareness construct. Specifically, we shift the
focus from static, direct rivals within a single industry
to include indirect competitors who cross industry
precincts, and from relying on reactive awareness to
having well-defined conditions under which compet-
itive encounters ensue (and do not ensue). These
conditions include (i) when a focal firm or its indirect
competitors are highly diversified, (ii) when a dyad’s
asymmetric pressure is high, (iii) when networks are
converging, and (iv) when the degree of separation
between firms is three or less. Although most threats
come from direct rivals and proximal indirect com-
petitors, topographical proximity alone cannot predict
competitive encounters, but the concomitant applica-
tionof allmultilevel awareness cues can.Thedegreeof
separation thresholdpresents aboundary conditionon
the hostility profile for how far—in terms of network
rungs—a focal firm should allocate awareness to in-
direct competitors (answer: up to third-degree indirect
competitors). Returning to the “the enemy of my en-
emy is my friend” doctrine, in the CEM arena (i) the
enemy ofmy enemy is oftenmy enemy, (ii) the enemy
of my enemy’s enemy can still be my enemy, but (iii)
the enemy of my third-degree indirect enemy is un-
likely to be my enemy. Thus, the awareness cues and
resulting hostility profile proffer a more predictive
AMC framework.
To clarify how the hostility profile advances the
SRFandaffordsanewwayof seeing, Figure4unpacks
these contributions in the context of past research.
Going from left to right and top to bottom, past re-
search has followed an industry view (e.g., market
commonality and resource similarity prescriptions)
to study existing, direct rivals. By contrast, our study
takes an arena view to profile indirect competitors
before hostility ensues. Past studies have focused
primarily on firm- and dyad-level encounters, but
ours complements such work with a network per-
spective that accounts formultisided competition. To
illustrate this point, consider the classification of ri-
vals as complementors, substitutors, suppliers, new
entrants, and so on (Peteraf & Bergen, 2003). Such
labels are certainly helpful, yet they do not reveal
which entity stands to become a direct rival. Our
study provides the theory and methodology to see
which complementor (out of many) might become a
direct rival, orwhether“SubstitutorA”posesagreater
threat compared to “Supplier B.”The hostility profile
builds on and goes beyond role classification as it
guides firmsandscholars to triage threats according to
the probability of competitive encounters.
The introduction of the TERGM to address
interdependent observations and their changes
over time constitutes a methodological contribution.
While relational data are necessary to capture all
awareness cues simultaneously, extant empirical re-
search has ignored the interdependence of numerous
drivers of interfirm encounters (Kim et al., 2016).
Consequently, the reliance on nonrelational methods
and single-level analysis has missed important in-
sights about interfirm relations and how landscape
structures emerge (Contractor et al., 2006). Our mul-
tilevel, network-centric approach overcomes such
limitations by explicitly modeling both exogenous
and endogenous dependencies among substructures
of competitive landscapes to reveal which indirect
competitors are likely to become direct rivals. The
magnitude, span, scope, and granularity of our study
(i.e., 15,824,693 observations, containing 142,446
competitive encounters, over a 10-year period and 29
SIC codes) plus the five robustness checks and
TERGM methodology are quite reassuring. Further-
more, in contrast to many CD studies that have over-
sampled public companies while deemphasizing
entrepreneurial firms,ourmultisourcedataset ismore
inclusive and quite representative of the typical
private–public ratio (94% vs. 6%). Naturally, the ro-
bustness of the hostility profile across time and com-
petitive arenas calls for further research, which we
address below.
Future CD Research
As with most studies, ours has certain limitations
that create opportunities for further CD research and
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for advancing the wider domain of management.
First, our findings are based on one, albeit diverse,
competitive arena (i.e., CEM), and though the setting
afforded new insights on amixture of mostly private
and a few public firms, future research should in-
vestigate the generalizability of the hostility profile
in other arenas. For instance, Markman, Waldron,
andPanagopoulos (2016) noted that someof themost
blindsiding attacks come not from traditional rivals
but from nonmarket players—e.g., activists and non-
governmental organizations. Future studies could ex-
amine whether different players and arenas require
distinctly different hostility profiles. Second, our ana-
lyses reveal that some indirect competitors in one pe-
riod becamedirect rivals a year or two later, suggesting
that future research could clarify the timing of com-
petitive engagements. Even if the AMC framework
adopted the hostility profile, it would still struggle to
time competitive encounters, so exploring modalities
tomeasure how long it takes for an indirect competitor
to become a direct rival would surely advance the
hostility profile.
A third area for future scholarship is for the AMC
framework to predict collaborative ties. To offer ex-
amples, alliances, buyer–supplier partnerships, and
joint ventures represent movements that alter net-
work morphology, so scholars could develop co-
operation profiles (demarcated areas within which
focal firms might select their most fitting allies and
partners). This would represent a valuable scholarly
effort as the proliferation of alliances (some firms are
members of 30–60 alliances) and the high failure
rate (60–70%) suggest that, despite their cooperative
aura, many alliances are also contentious (Hughes &
Weiss, 2007). Alliances and partnerships represent a
context that entails both collaboration and competi-
tion (Sonenshein, Nault, & Obodaru, 2017; Sytch &
Tatarynowicz, 2014), yet CD research and studies on
collaboration have rarely considered each other (a
notable exception isChen&Miller, 2015). This could
be a fruitful area for profiling research. The core
point: Just as the hostility profile nuances the AMC
framework, scholars can use our profiling principles
to nuance diverse dependent variables and make
theories more predictive.
Implications for the Broader Domain
of Management
As a profiling study, our research underscores the
need to apply a wider, farther, and better-calibrated
view of phenomena in competitive landscapes
(Levitt, 1960). Addressing the challenge of distant
foresight (Gavetti, 2012) to redress competitive my-
opia, profiling studies can employ our approach to
offer a cognitive representation to understand com-
plex, interdependent arenas. Indeed, the aerial maps
we featured (Figure 3) are akin to the cognitive maps
that managers employ in forward-looking search
processes (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000), and aid in
tracking threats and opportunities over time. Exem-
plifying this landscape complexity, a technology
lens—like an arena view—offers perspectives across
and beyond the boundaries of firms, markets, and
industries, so it can assist with profiling diverse
management phenomena. To illustrate the “blendi-
fication” of technologies, markets, and industries,
consider how clothing companies embed nano-
sensors that collect and emit a slew of predictive
health data (e.g., heart rate, insulin levels, etc.) while
supply-chain firms use artificial intelligence to
monitor and predict the operations and throughput
from raw resource providers to assembly lines and
then to consumers. We use these examples to show
that as technology becomes more fungible, scholars
will need better profiling modalities to analyze and
predict diverse cause–effect relations.
Reflecting on the allocation of attentional re-
sources, our treatment of awareness is complemen-
tary to attention-based view (ABV) research (Ocasio,
1997).TheABV literaturehasexplained that firms fail
todetect threats andprevent calamitiesnot becauseof
an absence of signals or insufficient knowledge (or
faulty awareness), but because attention bandwidth
and information-processing fidelity are inherently
limited (March & Simon, 1958; Ocasio, 1997; Ocasio,
Laamanen,&Vaara, 2018).Misalignment between the
granularity of managerial attention and the scale of a
threat can also cause attention failure—e.g., firms
might obtain a better view by applying either fine-
grained attention to study small-scale threats or broad
attention to look at large-scale threats (Bansal et al.,
2018). Restricted information processing and signal-
receiver misalignment certainly erode managerial at-
tention (McMullen, Shepherd, & Patzelt, 2009; Vuori
& Huy, 2016), but that is why research on profiling
modalities—to better define where to look, what
to search for, and how to decode signals—can
ameliorate attention and signal-receiver limita-
tions. Continued research into profiling modalities
may afford boundary-expanding foresights to see
around corners. Scholars could advance predictive
profiling techniques to match resources or capa-
bilities with opportunities, to foretell which en-
trants merit collaboration, and to vet allies and
suppliers.
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Profiling studies should also set clear boundary
conditions—e.g., in our sample, indirect competitors
who are four or more degrees of separation removed
from a focal firm require no awareness. Profiling
approaches have also been applied to market op-
portunity choice sets (Gruber, MacMillan, &
Thompson, 2008; Gruber et al., 2013) or opportu-
nity spaces (Kornish & Ulrich, 2011; Terwiesch &
Ulrich, 2009) to better define andprioritize a range of
promising venture ideas, scope the benefits and risks
related to potential business models, and foretell
growth options for established firms. The challenge,
of course, is that the dimensions and boundaries of
opportunity spaces and antecedents of great versus
average opportunities are not defined well enough.
Therefore, scholars might borrow the same logic
used in our study to better triangulate opportunity
spaces. The lesson to the extant management disci-
pline is that when studies expand theory while also
defining boundary conditions, they stand to make
more lasting contributions.
CONCLUSION
Despite substantive changes in how firms compete
and industries morph—combined with major meth-
odological advancements—the awareness construct
in the AMC framework has remained myopic. Using
an arena view to account for firm movement across
industries, we identified four awareness cues that
together define a hostility profile and make the
awareness construct more prescient. The hostility
profile is based on diversification (a firm-level cue),
asymmetric competitive pressure (at the dyad level),
and the convergence of landscapes and degree of
separation between firms (both network-level cues),
and predicts which indirect competitors are poised
to become direct rivals. We also showed that only
direct rivals and second- and third-degree indirect
competitors are revealed to be competitive threats by
thehostility profile, thusmeriting awareness (fourth-
degree indirect players and beyond do not). Overall,
our study provides theoretical and empirical refine-
ments to the construct and application of awareness,
thus affording scholars and firms a new way of seeing
competitive threats.
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2019 1899Downing, Kang, Markman
TABLE A4
Sensitivity of Degree of Separation to Cohort Selection Threshold and Higher k-Cycles
Variable
Lower Degree of Separation Threshold
(d 5 2) for Cohort Selection
Higher Degree of Separation
Effects (Higher k-Cycles)
Awareness Cues
Diversification H1 1.78* [1.11; 2.28] 1.70* [1.44; 2.00]
Asymmetric Pressure H2 0.27* [0.15; 0.44] 0.27* [0.22; 0.33]
Convergence H3a 0.48* [0.20; 0.75] 0.90* [0.76; 1.04]
3rd-Degree Separation H3b 0.12* [0.08; 0.20] 0.24* [0.21; 0.29]
4th-Degree Separation 20.03* [20.04;20.02] 20.05* [20.07; 20.03]
5th-Degree Separation 0.00 [20.00; 0.01]
6th-Degree Separation 0.00 [20.00; 0.00]
Firm-Level Controls
Firm Age 20.11* [20.15;20.06] 20.09* [20.11; 20.07]
Employees 0.00 [20.00; 0.00] 20.00 [20.00; 0.00]
Sales (US$ Mn.) 20.00 [20.00; 0.00] 0.00 [20.00; 0.00]
Competitive Pressure 20.03 [20.11; 0.03] 0.01 [20.02; 0.04]
Dyad-Level Controls
Firm Age Absolute Difference 0.12* [0.08; 0.17] 0.10* [0.08; 0.12]
Ownership Status Homophily 0.24 [21.11; 2.23] 0.15 [20.16; 0.49]
HQ Region Homophily 0.02 [20.41; 0.54] 0.00 [20.17; 0.16]
Firm Branch Multimarket Contact 23.05 [25.64; 0.28] 23.21* [25.03; 21.92]
Category Relatedness 1.83* [1.43; 2.12] 1.53* [1.19; 1.92]
Shared Investors 0.07 [20.11; 0.28] 20.06 [20.36; 0.18]
Network-Level Controls
Network Constant 23.25* [25.44;21.16] 22.48* [23.35; 21.80]
Geometrically Weighted Edgewise
Shared Competitors 0.36* [0.10; 0.60] 0.51* [0.43; 0.61]
Geometrically Weighted Competitors 20.91 [21.85; 0.08] 21.24* [21.62; 20.78]
Temporal Stability 4.93* [4.68; 5.92] 5.44* [5.22; 5.74]
Temporal Trend 0.03 [20.16; 0.25] 20.06 [20.14; 0.04]
Observations (Dyad-Year) 85,173 815,351
Competitive Encounters (Dyad-Year) 2,056 7,489
Firms 168 532
*95% bootstrapped confidence interval [shown in brackets] does not contain 0.
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